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Abstract 
This paper provides a politico-economic analysis of the European Union’s (EU) R&D policy. It 
develops an open-economy R&D-growth model characterized by two parameters that capture respectively 
the degree of technology spillover and the effectiveness of lobbying. In a non-cooperative equilibrium, 
each country chooses the level of R&D subsidy independently and fails to internalize technology 
spillover. Consequently, R&D subsidy is underprovided. In an economic union, the central government 
internalizes technology spillover but is vulnerable to lobbying by politicians from each country, who 
attempt to free-ride on the central government budget. Consequently, R&D subsidy is overprovided; 
however, this overprovision becomes less severe as the degree of technology spillover increases. 
Therefore, technology spillover has a surprisingly positive effect on welfare in an economic union. As for 
the effect on relative welfare, there is a cutoff value for the degree of technology spillover such that if and 
only if spillover is above this threshold, then an economic union dominates independent countries in 
welfare. Furthermore, this threshold is an increasing function in the effectiveness of lobbying. This paper 
also considers the possibility that the EU faces a binding budget ceiling. In this case, lobbying on R&D 
subsidy exerts a distortionary effect on revenue allocation, and hence a welfare loss continues to exist. 
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1. Introduction 
At the European Council of 2002 in Barcelona, the European Union (EU) sets an objective of increasing 
the research and development (R&D) effort in Europe to 3% of the EU’s GDP by 2010. Because of 
externalities associated with R&D investment, the market equilibrium level of R&D spending is likely to 
be lower than the social optimum.1 Therefore, government intervention may be able to correct for this 
market failure. For example, in a quantitative analysis, Eaton et al. (1998) find that increasing R&D 
subsidy can lead to a significant increase in the EU’s per capita income.2 However, because these benefits 
of R&D subsidy are largely shared across countries, individual country has little incentive to pursue these 
policies on its own. This conventional policy argument suggests a role for supranational government 
intervention, such as the EU for the European economies, on R&D policies.  
An important example is the Framework Programme (FP) for Research and Technological 
Development,3  which is the EU’s main instrument for funding research in Europe. Two interesting 
features of the FP are (a) the budget of FP7 (2007 to 2013) has increased significantly to €50.5 billion 
compared to €17.5 billion for FP6 (2002 to 2006), and (b) research priorities in FP are the result of 
political negotiations. During the Commission’s initial drafting of proposals for the FP and the process of 
reviewing these proposals in the European Parliament and the Council, interest groups have opportunities 
to exert their influences through lobbying.4 For example, in a study by the European Institute of Romania, 
the authors argue that “[t]he current system in which the priorities of The Framework programs are the 
result of political negotiations in the Council… leads to a useless increase of the priorities number…” 
Pre-Accession Impact Studies III (no. 8, p. 50) 
This paper provides a politico-economic analysis of the EU’s R&D policies and argues that there 
exists a non-trivial tradeoff between R&D subsidy provided by an economic union and R&D subsidy 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Jones and Williams (1998, 2000). 
2 “It takes less than a 5% research subsidy to raise average per capita income levels in the European Union to a 
higher steady-state level of 10%.” Eaton et al. (1998, p. 408) 
3 Detailed information about this program is posted on its website (http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/home_en.html). 
4 Langenberg (2004) provides a detailed case study of the decision-making process on FP6 and discusses the 
opportunities in which interest groups can influence the Commission and the Parliament. Bache and George (2006) 
provide a comprehensive discussion on the EU’s policy process and the influences of interest groups. 
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provided by independent countries. In particular, it develops a simple open-economy R&D-growth model 
characterized by two parameters that capture respectively the degree of technology spillover and the 
effectiveness of lobbying.  
In a non-cooperative equilibrium between independent countries, each country chooses the level 
of R&D subsidy non-cooperatively and fails to internalize the benefits of technology spillover on the 
other country. As a result, R&D subsidy is underprovided, and this underprovision becomes more severe 
as the degree of technology spillover increases. In an economic union, the central government is 
vulnerable to lobbying by politicians from each country, who have the incentive to free-ride on the central 
government budget. As a result, R&D subsidy is overprovided, and this overprovision becomes more 
severe as the effectiveness of lobbying increases. In contrast, as the degree of technology spillover 
increases, the overprovision of R&D subsidy becomes less severe. Therefore, technology spillover has a 
surprisingly positive effect on welfare in an economic union. As for the effect on relative welfare, there is 
a cutoff value for the degree of technology spillover such that if and only if spillover is above this 
threshold, then an economic union dominates independent countries in welfare. Furthermore, this 
threshold for technology spillover is an increasing function in the effectiveness of lobbying.  
The above analysis implicitly assumes that the central government can raise as much revenue as it 
sees fit. However, the EU’s budget has a ceiling of 1.24% of the EU-27’s gross national income. 
Therefore, this paper also considers the possibility that the EU faces a binding budget constraint and 
shows that lobbying on R&D subsidy continues to exert a distortionary effect through revenue 
misallocation and leads to a welfare loss. 
 
Related Literature 
This paper relates to the R&D endogenous-growth literature. In variants of closed-economy R&D-growth 
models, Segerstrom (2000) analyzes the growth effects of R&D subsidy while Peretto (2007) analyzes the 
welfare effects of R&D tax credit. In an open-economy R&D-growth model, Impullitti (2007, 2008) 
performs a quantitative analysis of international R&D-subsidy game and quantifies the welfare effects of 
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R&D-subsidy coordination. The current study complements this literature by incorporating the political-
economy aspects, such as lobbying and free-riding, of coordination into the analysis of R&D subsidy 
within an endogenous-growth model.5  
 Persson and Tabellini (1994) analyze the effect of centralization on the size of government budget 
and the provision of local public goods and find that a positive effect arises due to lobbying by politicians, 
who have the incentive to free-ride on the central government budget.6 The current study incorporates this 
effect into the analysis of R&D subsidy and extends their study by allowing for spillover effects and 
considering the possibility of a binding budget ceiling. I show that the presence of technology spillover 
reduces the magnitude of overprovision and that lobbying in the case of a binding budget ceiling 
continues to exert a distortionary effect through revenue misallocation. 
In a complementary study, Chu and Yang (2008) also analyze the tradeoff between spillover 
effects of local public goods under decentralization and the common-pool problem under centralization. 
Chu and Yang (2008) simplify the macroeconomy by using a simple AK-growth model in order to 
formulate the strategic interaction between agents as a differential game and analyze the equilibrium 
outcomes under different solution concepts. In contrast, the current study simplifies the game-theoretic 
dimension of the analysis in order to focus on a richer growth engine that is suitable for analyzing R&D 
subsidy, which is an important policy instrument. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the underlying R&D-growth 
model. Section 3 provides the politico-economic analysis. The final section concludes. All proofs are 
relegated to Appendix A.  
  
                                                 
5 Drazen (2000, ch. 11) and Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 14) provide a comprehensive review on the political 
economy of growth. In a related study, Chu (2008) provides a politico-economic analysis on the special interest 
politics of pharmaceutical patents in the US. 
6 This idea of centralization causing a common-pool problem has long been recognized by political economists and 
was formalized by Weingast et al. (1981) in a model of pork-barrel spending. In a cross-country empirical study, 
Bradbury and Crain (2001) provide supportive evidence for the presence of this common-pool problem.   
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2. The Model 
The quality-ladder growth model is a modified version of Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and 
Helpman (1991a). There are two symmetric countries indexed by },{ ban∈ . Transportation costs are 
assumed to be zero, and trade is balanced in every period. For analytical tractability, the model features 
both differentiated goods and homogenous goods with a quasi-linear preference as in Grossman and Lai 
(2004). Each monopolistic firm sells intermediate goods in both countries. At the aggregate level, any 
transfer of dividend income across the two countries is balanced by an equal value of trade in 
homogenous goods. The model is also modified to allow for in-house R&D performed by industry leaders 
as in Peretto (1999) and to eliminate scale effects as in Segerstrom (1998).7 Given that quality-ladder 
models are relatively well-studied, the model’s components are briefly sketched out in Sections 2.1 – 2.4, 
and detailed derivations are relegated to an unpublished appendix available upon request. The balanced-
growth equilibrium is defined in Section 2.5, and the welfare function that will be used for the policy 
analysis is derived in Section 2.6. 
  
 2.1. Households  
There is a continuum of identical households on the unit interval residing in each of the two symmetric 
countries indexed by a superscript },{ ban∈ . Their lifetime utility function is  
(1) dtueU nt
tgn L∫∞ −−=
0
)(ρ , 
and the instantaneous utility function is 
(2) mn tq
nn
tq
n
th
n
t cccu
,
,
,
,, lnln)1( θθ +−+= . 
n
thc ,  is the per capita consumption of homogenous goods chosen as the numeraire. 
mn
tqc
,
,  refers to quality-
enhancing differentiated goods consumed by country n  and produced by country m . ]5.0,0[ .∈θ  is the 
share of differentiated goods traded and captures the degree of technology spillover. Each household has 
                                                 
7 See Jones (1995a, 1999) for a discussion of scale effects in R&D-growth models. 
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)exp( tgL Lt =  members at time t, and Lg  is the exogenous population growth rate. Lg>ρ  is the 
subjective discount rate. Each household maximizes utility subject to a sequence of budget constraints  
(3) nt
mn
tq
mn
tq
nn
tq
nn
tq
n
th
n
t
n
tLt
n
t cPcPcwagra τ−−−−+−= ,,,,,,,,,)(& . 
n
ta  is the per capita holding of financial assets, and 
n
ta&  denotes the change in nta  with respect to time. tr  
is the real rate of return on nta  and equals ρ  for all t (a property of the quasi-linear preference) from the 
household’s intertemporal optimization. Because r  is constant over time, its time subscript will be 
suppressed for easier exposition. As for the value of financial assets, it equals the market value of 
monopolistic firms. Each person supplies one unit of homogenous labor in each period to earn a wage 
income ntw  and pays a lump-sum tax 
n
tτ .  
Differentiated final goods are produced by a CES aggregator over a continuum of differentiated 
intermediate goods ]1,0[∈j  given by  
(4) 
ε
ε
/11
0
,
,
,
, ))(( ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫ djjYY mntqmntq  
where )1,0(∈ε . )(,, jY mntq  refers to intermediate goods j consumed by country n and produced by country 
m. The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods is )1/(1 ε− .  
 
 2.2. Homogenous Goods 
There exists a large number of competitive firms in each country producing the homogenous goods nthY , . 
The production function has constant returns to scale in labor input n thL ,  given by  
(5) n th
n
th LY ,, .α= . 
The marginal cost of production is  
(6) α/, ntn th wMC = . 
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Because the homogenous goods are chosen to be the numeraire and this sector is characterized by 
marginal-cost pricing, 1, =n thMC  and α=ntw  for },{ ban∈ .  
  
 2.3. Differentiated Goods 
In each country, there is a continuum of industries on the unit interval producing the differentiated 
intermediate goods. Each industry ]1,0[∈j  in country n is dominated by a permanent monopolistic 
leader as in Peretto (1999). The production function in industry j is  
(7) )()()()( ,
,
,
,
, jLjAjYjY
n
tq
n
t
nm
tq
nn
tq =+ . 
)(, jL
n
tq  is the number of workers in industry j of country n. )( jA
n
t  is the industry leader’s marginal 
product of labor, which increases over time due to technological innovation driven by the leader’s R&D 
investment. The marginal cost of production in industry j of country n is )(/)(, jAwjMC
n
t
n
t
n
tq = . To 
maximize profit, the industry leader charges a markup μ  over the marginal cost such that 
(8) )()()( ,
,
,
,
, . jMCjPjP
n
tq
nm
tq
nn
tq μ== , 
where εμ /1≡  is determined by the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods.  
  
 2.4. R&D 
Given a level of technology )( jAnt  in industry j  of country n at time t, the gross amount of flow profit 
in this industry before deducting the cost of R&D investment is given by  
(9) ))()()(()1()( ,,
,
,, jYjYjMCj
nm
tq
nn
tq
n
tq
n
t +−= μπ , 
which is increasing in the industry’s level of technology relative to the country’s level of technology 
given by 
εε
εε
/)1(1
0
)1/()(
−
− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡ ∫ djjAA ntnt . To improve its level of technology, an industry leader invests in 
R&D, and the law of motion for )( jAnt  is given by  
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 (10) γϕ ))(()( , jLjA n trntnt =& , 
where )1,0(∈γ  captures the degree of decreasing returns to scale in R&D investment, and ntϕ  is the 
R&D productivity in country n that the industry leader takes as given. To eliminate scale effects, ntϕ  is 
assumed to be  
(11) φϕϕ )( ntnt A= , 
where the parameter 1<φ  captures the externality of intertemporal knowledge spillovers from the 
country’s level of technology.8  
The net amount of flow profit after deducting the cost of R&D is  
(12) ))()(1()()(~ , jLwsjj
n
tr
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t −−= ππ , 
where ]1,0[∈nts  is the subsidy rate for R&D investment in country n. The market value of firm j  in 
country n is the present value of the stream of net profits )(~ jntπ  given by   
(13) dujejV nu
t
turn
t )(~)(
)( π∫∞ −−= . 
An industry leader maximizes (13) subject to (10) taking ntA  and 
n
ts  as given. As in Peretto (1999), I 
focus on the symmetric equilibrium across industry ]1,0[∈j  within each country. 
 
 2.5. Balanced-Growth Equilibrium  
The analysis starts at 0=t  when the economy has reached its balanced-growth path corresponding to the 
fiscal policies },{ nns τ  for },{ ban∈ . The equilibrium is a sequence of prices ∞=0,,,, },,,,{ tntmntqnntqntt VPPwr  
and a sequence of allocations ∞=0,,,
,
,
,
,, },,,,,,{ t
n
th
n
tr
n
tq
mn
tq
nn
tq
n
th
n
t LLLccca  for },{ ban∈ . Also, in each period,  
                                                 
8  As discussed in Jones (1995b), )1,0(∈φ  corresponds to the “standing-on-shoulder” effect, in which R&D 
productivity increases as the level of technology increases. On the other hand, 0<φ  corresponds to the opposite 
case of the “fishing-out” effect. I assume local knowledge spillover at the national level as in Grossman and 
Helpman (1991b). 
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(a) households in country n choose },,,{ ,,
,
,,
mn
tq
nn
tq
n
th
n
t ccca  to maximize (1) subject to (2) taking 
},,,{ ,,
,
,
mn
tq
nn
tq
n
tt PPwr  and the lump-sum tax 
nτ  as given;  
(b) the competitive homogenous-goods firms in country n choose }{ ,
n
thL  to maximize profits taking 
}{ ntw  as given; 
(c) industry leader j in country n chooses )}(),(),(),({ ,,
,
,
,
, jLjLjPjP
n
tr
n
tq
nm
tq
nn
tq  to maximize the firm’s 
market value taking },),(),({ ,,
,
,
n
t
n
t
nm
tq
nn
tq AwjYjY  and the R&D subsidy rate 
ns  as given;  
(d) the global market for homogenous goods clears; 
(e) the market for quality-enhancing goods in each country clears;  
(f) the labor market in each country clears. 
To solve for the balanced-growth rate of ntA  denoted by 
n
Ag , the law of motion for 
n
tA  becomes  
(14) γφϕ )()( ,n trntnt LAA =&  
after substituting (11) into (10) and applying the symmetry condition. In the followings, I show that n trL ,  
increases at Lg . Therefore, 
n
Ag  must be proportional to Lg  because  
(15) Ln
t
n
tr
n
t
n
tn
A gA
L
A
Ag φ
γϕ
φ
γ
−==≡ − 1)(
)(
1
,
&
. 
Given bA
a
A gg = , I denote )1/( φγ −==≡ LbAaAA gggg . The long-run technology growth rate is 
determined by exogenous parameters (i.e. a semi-endogenous growth model as in Jones (1995b, 1999)). 
In this model, a permanent increase in R&D subsidy increases the long-run level of technology holding 
the long-run growth rate constant.  
In the unpublished appendix available upon request, I show that the balanced-growth equilibrium 
outcomes are characterized by 
(16) t
n
tq LL ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= α
ε
, , 
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(17) t
LA
A
n
n
tr Lgg
g
s
L ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−= α
ε
ρ
γ
1
1
, , 
(18) t
LA
A
n
n
th Lgg
g
s
L ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−+−= ρ
γ
α
ε
1
111, , 
(19) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= α
εθ
n
tnn
tq
Ac ,, , 
(20) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−= α
εθ
m
tmn
tq
Ac )1(,, , 
(21) nL
nn
h agc )(1 −+−−= ρτα , 
(22) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−++−=− LA
An
L gg
gag ρ
γερ .11)( . 
α  is assumed to be sufficiently large such that each person in country n consumes a positive amount of 
homogenous goods. Also, the following parameter restriction ensures that the amount of dividend income 
n
L ag )( −ρ  is positive.  
(a1) ),0( εε ∈ , 
where )/()( LAALA ggggg −++−+≡ ργρε . (a1) imposes an upper bound on the substitution 
elasticity to ensure that the gross amount of monopolistic profit is sufficient to pay for the cost of R&D.  
 
 2.6. Social Welfare  
This section derives the social-welfare function that will be used for the policy analysis. Given the 
equilibrium conditions on the balanced-growth path, the representative household’s lifetime utility (1) can 
be rewritten as  
(23)     ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+−
+−+= ∫∞ −− dttgeg cccU AtgL
mn
q
nn
q
n
hn L )(
lnln)1(
0
)(
,
0,
,
0, ρ
ρ
θθ
. 
After dropping the constant terms and the exogenous balanced-growth path, social welfare becomes 
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(24) )(ln)(ln)1()()( 00
mmnnnn
h
n
L
n sAsAcUgW θθτρ +−+=−≡ .9 
n
hc  is a function of 
nτ  because an increase in nτ  reduces the consumption of nhc . nA0  is a function of ns  
because an increase in ns  raises the number of R&D workers and hence the level of technology in 
country n. Differentiating the balanced-growth condition (15) with respect to ns  yields  
(25) n
n
r
n
n
s
L
s
A
∂
∂
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−=∂
∂ 0,0 ln
1
ln
φ
γ
. 
For 0>θ , an increase in ns  increases nA0  that benefits households in both countries while the tax 
burden of n tr
nn
t
n LwsL ,=τ  falls upon domestic households. This leads to a positive externality of 
technology spillover, and the degree of spillover is determined by the share of differentiated goods traded.  
 
3. A Politico-Economic Analysis 
There is a group of politicians in each country, and their objective is to maximize the welfare of 
households in their country. In the case of independent countries, politicians in each country form a 
national government and choose the level of R&D subsidy independently and simultaneously. This policy 
outcome will be referred to as the non-cooperative equilibrium between independent countries. In the case 
of an economic union, there is a central government that internalizes technology spillover; however, this 
central government is vulnerable to lobbying by politicians from each country. This policy outcome will 
be referred to as the political equilibrium in an economic union. In both regimes, I follow Grossman and 
Lai (2004) to solve the Nash equilibrium in which agents choose their policies once and for all at time 0. 
The following sections derive the cooperative equilibrium, the non-cooperative equilibrium between 
independent countries, and the political equilibrium in an economic union. Then, I consider the possibility 
of a binding budget ceiling faced by the economic union.  
  
                                                 
9 In order to perform the welfare analysis analytically, I focus on social welfare along the balanced-growth path as in 
Grossman and Lai (2004). To capture the transition dynamics, numerical analysis becomes necessary.  
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 3.1. Cooperative Equilibrium  
I firstly derive the cooperative equilibrium that is free from lobbying and technology spillover. This 
equilibrium serves as a very useful benchmark for comparison. In this case, the two groups of politicians 
cooperate and maximize ba WW +  subject to b trbba traatba LwsLwsL ,,)( +=+ττ . To simplify notation, 
two new parameters 0)/()1(. >−+−≡Ω LAA ggg ρφε  and 0)1/( >−≡Φ φγ  are defined.  
 
Lemma 1: The cooperative equilibrium is characterized by  
(26) Ω−=1*s , 
(27) )1(* Ω−Φ=τ . 
 
At the optimal R&D subsidy rate *s , the number of R&D workers is at the social optimum given by 
)/()max(arg*, αtbatr LWWL Φ=+≡ . The government is able to use R&D subsidy to achieve the first-
best outcome for R&D spending because the lump-sum tax does not have any distortionary effect. 
  
 3.2. Independent Countries  
I now derive the non-cooperative equilibrium between independent countries that is vulnerable to 
technology spillover. In this case, politicians in country n choose ns  to maximize nW  subject to 
n
tr
nn
t
n LwsL ,=τ  taking ms  as given. 
 
Lemma 2: The non-cooperative equilibrium between independent countries is characterized by  
(28) *)1/(1)( ssind ≤−Ω−=
−
θθ , 
(29) *)1()( τθθτ ≤Ω−−Φ=
−
ind . 
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(28) shows that *ssind <  for 0>θ . Due to the positive externality of technology spillover, the two 
countries under-subsidize R&D in equilibrium. The magnitude of this underprovision is increasing in the 
degree of technology spillover θ .  
 
 3.3. Economic Union 
I now derive the political equilibrium in an economic union. In this case, the central government is 
vulnerable to lobbying by politicians from each country. The campaign-contribution lobbying model 
originates from Grossman and Helpman (1994).10 Each group of politicians maximizes nW  by choosing 
an amount of campaign contribution nz  in each period that is financed by households in country n. I 
follow Persson and Tabellini (1994) to assume that the politicians can commit to a contribution schedule 
)( nn sZz =  that is a differentiable and increasing function in ns . Taking the contribution schedule 
)( nsZ  as given, the central government maximizes   
(30) )()()( babbaa zzzWzW ++−+− ω ,11  
subject to b tr
bba
tr
aa
t
ba LwsLwsL ,,)( +=+ττ . ω  is the weight that the central government places on 
campaign contributions and captures the effectiveness of lobbying. I assume 1>ω  as in Persson and 
Tabellini (1994) so that lobbying will have an effect on the policy outcome.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 In the political-economy literature, there is another branch of lobbying model based on information asymmetry. 
See, for example, Grossman and Helpman (2001, Section II). In the EU, informational lobbying is probably more 
important than campaign contributions. However, I decide to adopt a campaign-contribution lobbying model for two 
reasons. Firstly, this model is more tractable to be incorporated into an R&D-growth model. Secondly, this 
formulation is consistent with Persson and Tabellini (1994) for an easier direct comparison.   
11 As in Persson and Tabellini (1994), I do not specify a political mechanism on how the central government uses the 
amount of campaign contributions. One possibility suggested in this type of literature is that the government uses the 
funding for redistributive politics in order to gain political support from marginal voters.  
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Lemma 3: The political equilibrium in an economic union is characterized by  
(31) *
1
.
)]1)(1(1[2
11),( sseu ≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−+
+Ω−=
≤
−+ 444 3444 21 θω
ωθω , 
(32) *.
1
)]1)(1(1[2),( τω
θωθωτ ≥⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ Ω−+
−−+Φ=
−+
eu , 
(33)   ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−+
+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−
ΦΩ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−−= )]1)(1(1[2
11
111
,0max)( *
*
θω
ω
ωs
s
s
ssZ eu
eu
eu . 
 
(31) shows that *sseu >  for 5.0<θ  and 1>ω . Having the incentive to free-ride on the central 
government budget, politicians from each country lobby the central government in order to obtain more 
R&D subsidy for their country. This multilateral attempt results into an excessive amount of R&D 
subsidy in equilibrium, and this overprovision is increasing in the effectiveness of lobbying ω . In 
contrast, the overprovision is decreasing in the degree of technology spillover θ  because the politicians 
have less incentive to lobby the central government when increasing R&D subsidy partly benefits the 
other country. At 5.0=θ , *sseu =  for any 1>ω  and hence 0=euz .  
  
 3.4. Welfare Analysis 
(15) and (17) determine )(0
nn sA  while (21) determines )( nnhc τ . Substituting (26) – (29) into (24) yields 
the welfare difference between the cooperative equilibrium and the non-cooperative equilibrium between 
independent countries given by   
(34) 0
1
1ln)(* >⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−Φ=− − θθθ
indWW  
for 0>θ . indWW −*  is increasing in θ . Relative to the cooperative equilibrium, the non-cooperative 
governments underprovide R&D subsidies, and the welfare loss from this underprovision increases in θ .  
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Similarly, the welfare difference between the cooperative equilibrium and the political 
equilibrium in an economic union is  
(35) 0
)]1)(1(1[2
1ln
)1(
)21)(1(),(* >⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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⎜⎜⎝
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−−+
+++
−−Φ=−
+− θω
ω
ω
θωθωeuWW ,12 
for 5.0<θ  and 1>ω . euWW −*  is increasing in ω  and decreasing in θ . Relative to the cooperative 
equilibrium, politicians in country n attempt to externalize the tax burden of ns  to the other country by 
lobbying the central government to increase ns . As ω  increases, the central government becomes more 
responsive to contributions; as a result, the problem of overprovision becomes more severe. As θ  
increases, the benefit of increasing ns  for the households in country n decreases; as a result, politicians’ 
lobbying intensity and the magnitude of overprovision decrease.  
Finally, the welfare difference between the political equilibrium in an economic union and the 
non-cooperative equilibrium between independent countries is  
(36) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−−−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−
−−+Φ=−
−+− )1(
)21)(1(
)1)(1(
)]1)(1(1[2ln)(),( . ω
θωθωθ
θωθθω indeu WW . 
Because euW  is increasing in θ  while indW  is decreasing in θ , there exists a cutoff value θ  defined as 
0=− =θθindeu WW . When θ  is above θ , welfare is higher in an economic union. Furthermore, θ  is an 
increasing function in ω . Proposition 1 summarizes these findings.  
 
Proposition 1: There exists )5.0,0( .∈θ  such that when ]5.0,(θθ ∈ , indeu WW > , and 0/ >∂∂ ωθ . 
 
                                                 
12 Note that for the political equilibrium, I define welfare in each country as the sum of the households’ utility and 
the amount of campaign contributions given to the central government. I have checked that defining welfare as the 
households’ utility and assuming that the amount of campaign contributions is completely wasted will change 
neither the properties of euW  nor the results in Proposition 1.  
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To illustrate, Figure 1 plots indeu WW −  against θ  and shows the comparative statics with respect to 
increases in ω . Figure 2 plots the actual numerical values for θ  against ω .13 
 
3.5. Economic Union with a Binding Budget Ceiling 
A potential criticism against the previous formulation is that the economic union does not face a budget 
ceiling. In other words, the central government can raise as much revenue as it sees fit. However, this 
assumption may be inconsistent with the European institutional structure that the EU faces a ceiling on its 
budget. This section is devoted to analyze this scenario.  
 Suppose the EU’s Commission is given a fixed tax rate τ . Then, the Commission would simply 
allocate an equal amount of R&D subsidy to each country. In this case, the equilibrium amount of 
campaign contributions would be zero because each country always receives half the tax revenue as R&D 
subsidy. If it turns out that τ  happens to be at the optimal level (i.e. *ττ =  as in the cooperative 
equilibrium), then an economic union would trivially deliver the efficient outcome of R&D subsidy 
because lobbying is completely ineffective given a fixed amount of tax revenue. However, this reasoning 
only applies when there is a single item on the Commission’s budget. In reality, there are multiples items 
on the Commission’s budget, and the presence of lobbying may still lead to a distortionary effect through 
revenue misallocation. As a result, a tradeoff between R&D subsidy provided by an economic union and 
R&D subsidy provided by independent countries continues to exist. 
 To see this, I will incorporate an additional public goods into the households’ utility function  
(2’) t
mn
tq
nn
tq
n
th
n
t Gcccu lnlnln)1(
,
,
,
,, ++−+= θθ , 
where tG  is the per capita level of public goods in the economic union. An example of tG  is the per 
capita spending on union security in the EU. It is easy to see that the in the cooperative equilibrium, the 
equilibrium outcomes are 1=G , *ss =  as in (26), and *1 ττ += , where *τ  is as in (27).  
                                                 
13 From (36), θ  is a function in only one parameter ω .  
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 As for the political equilibrium, I will consider the case in which the maximum tax rate τ  is set 
to the efficient level *1 τ+  such that if there is any distortionary effect, it arises from the misallocation of 
an efficient amount of tax revenue. Also, given that the public goods (i.e. union security) have complete 
spillover across the union, there is no incentive for lobbying on this item.  
 
Lemma 4: The political equilibrium in an economic union under a binding budget ceiling *1 τττ +≡≤  
is characterized by  
(37) ],[),( ***
*
* eu
eu
bc ss
s
sss ∈⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
+=
−+ τ
τθω , 
(38) 1
1
1),( ≤−
−=
+− bc
eu
bc
s
sG θω , 
(39) 0ln
1
1ln),( *
* ≥−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−Φ=−
+−
bc
bc
bc G
s
sWW θω . 
 
(37) and (38) show that unless either 1=ω  or 5.0=θ , the presence of lobbying on R&D subsidy still 
distorts bcs  and bcG  away from their optimal levels. This distortionary effect results into a welfare loss 
relative to the cooperative equilibrium, and the magnitude of this welfare loss is increasing in the 
effectiveness of lobbying and decreasing in technology spillover as before. (39) shows that unless either 
1=ω  or 5.0=θ , *WW bc < . 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper provides a politico-economic analysis of R&D policies in the EU and argues that there exists a 
non-trivial tradeoff between R&D subsidy provided by an economic union (characterized by lobbying and 
overprovision) and R&D subsidy provided by independent countries (characterized by technology 
spillover and underprovision). The analysis suggests that the presence of externalities associated with 
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R&D subsidy is not a sufficient argument for supranational government intervention. However, despite 
ambiguity in policy prescription, the finding that an economic union dominates independent countries in 
welfare if and only if the degree of technology spillover is larger than a moderate value should be 
comforting to those advocating supranational government intervention by the EU on R&D policies. After 
all, a substantial degree of technology spillover is most likely to prevail in the real world, and R&D-
policy coordination in Europe should do more good than harm.14 
 Finally, the model is highly stylized and features only one type of externality associated with 
R&D subsidy in order to highlight the tradeoff between overprovision from lobbying and underprovision 
from technology spillover that seems to be the most relevant factor. A more general model that features 
multiple externalities, such as a dividend-income externality and an international business-stealing effect, 
associated with R&D subsidy can be developed by assuming that the elasticity of substitution between 
home and foreign differentiated goods to be greater than one. In this model, some equilibrium conditions 
are substantially more complicated that the Nash-equilibrium level of R&D subsidies becomes an implicit 
function. Nonetheless, a tradeoff between centralized and decentralized provision of R&D subsidy should 
continue to exist in the presence of multiple externalities associated with R&D subsidy.  
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Appendix A 
Proof for Lemma 1: The two groups of politicians cooperate and maximize  
bab
h
a
h
ba AAccWW 00 lnln +++=+  
by sharing the tax burden equally. Substituting (17) into (15) and taking log yield  
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Substituting (22) into (21) yields 
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Therefore, after dropping the exogenous terms, the objective function simplifies to  
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Substituting (17) into the balanced-budget condition yields  
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Maximizing ba WW +  subject to the balanced-budget condition yields (26) – (27).□  
 
Proof for Lemma 2: The government in country n maximizes  
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h
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by choosing ns  while taking ms  as given. Following the same steps as in Lemma 1 yields 
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Maximizing nW  subject to the balanced-budget condition yields (28) – (29).□ 
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Proof for Lemma 3: The central government maximizes  
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Following the same steps as in Lemma 1 yields 
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Maximizing )()()( babbaa zzzWzW ++−+− ω  subject to the balanced-budget condition yields the 
first-order condition from the central government given by  
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To determine nn ssZ ∂∂ /)( , the politicians in country n maximize nn zW −  by choosing ns  subject to 
)( nn sZz =  and know that they will only share half of the tax burden from an increase in ns  (i.e. 
2/)( ,,
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n LwsLwsL +=τ ). Therefore, the first-order condition is  
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Substituting nn ssZ ∂∂ /)(  into the central government’s first-order condition yields  
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Firstly, this condition and the balanced-budget condition yield (31) – (32). Secondly, combining this 
condition and the central government’s first-order condition shows that  
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Integrating nn ssZ ∂∂ /)(  with respect to ns  yields  
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where C  is an integration constant. Using the property that 0)( =eusZ  for *sseu ≤ , the contribution 
schedule is  
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Substituting eus  and *s  into )( eusZ  yields  
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Proof for Proposition 1: euW  is increasing in θ  while indW  is decreasing in θ . Therefore, 
indeu WW −  is increasing in θ . When 0=θ , indeu WW <  due to the absence of externality in indW . 
When 5.0=θ , indeu WW >  due to the absence of free-riding in euW . Thus, there exists )5.0,0( .∈θ  
such that when ]5.0,(θθ ∈ , indeu WW > . For 0/ >∂∂ ωθ , note indeu WW −  is decreasing in ω .□ 
 
Proof for Lemma 4: The commission maximizes  
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Following the same steps as before yields 
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The commission maximizes this objective function subject to  
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taking the inequality constraint 1* +≡≤ τττ  as given. For the relevant case in which the inequality 
constraint is binding, the Commission’s first-order condition with respect to ns  is  
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To determine nn ssZ ∂∂ /)( , the politicians in country n maximize nn zW −  by choosing ns  subject to 
)( nn sZz =  and know that their country’s tax burden will only be half of the reduction in G , i.e. 
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Substituting nn ssZ ∂∂ /)(  into the Commission’s first-order condition yields  
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where the terms in the right simplify to eus−1  in (31). Combining this condition with the balanced-
budget condition and 1* +≡ττ  yields 
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Substituting these conditions into the household’s welfare function yields 
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Figure 2: Cutoff Values for Technology Spillover
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Figure 1: Comparative Statics in ω 
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